Id., at 448-450. 557 F.Supp., at 447. . Nor is it a matter of the wisdom or folly of certain policy choices. Apparently the Court believes that when "an unelected federal judiciary" makes decisions as to whether a particular function is one for the Federal or State Governments, the States no longer may engage in "social and economic experiment." § 152(2); the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. We held that the inquiry into a particular function's "traditional" nature was merely a means of determining whether the federal statute at issue unduly handicaps "basic state prerogatives," id., at 686-687, 102 S.Ct., at 1354-1355, but we did not offer an explanation of what makes one state function a "basic prerogative" and another function not basic. At one time in our history, the view that the structure of the Federal Government sufficed to protect the States might have had a somewhat more practical, although not a more logical, basis. Nonetheless, it long has been settled that Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause extends to intrastate economic activities that affect interstate commerce. Incidental to this expansion of the commerce power, Congress has been given an ability it lacked prior to the emergence of an integrated national economy.
The point of the inquiry, however, has remained to single out particular features of a State's internal governance that are deemed to be intrinsic parts of state sovereignty.
326 (1946) (dissenting opinion). But see United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 86-87, 98 S.Ct. This Court has been increasingly generous in its interpretation of the commerce power of Congress, primarily to assure that the National Government would be able to deal with national economic problems. If the power was not given, Congress could not exercise it; if given, they might exercise it, although it should interfere with the laws, or even the Constitution of the States." Thus far, this Court itself has made little headway in defining the scope of the governmental functions deemed protected under National League of Cities. Raymond J. DONOVAN, Secretary of Labor, Appellant v. SAN ANTONIO METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY et al. The States unquestionably do "retai[n] a significant measure of sovereign authority." EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S., at 269, 103 S.Ct., at 1077 (POWELL, J., dissenting). The administration and enforcement of federal laws and regulations necessarily are largely in the hands of staff and civil service employees. See Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1983: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.
SA 79 CA 458. . denied, 434 U.S. 902, 98 S.Ct. See n. 9, supra. The District Court has stayed that action pending the outcome of these cases, but it allowed Garcia to intervene in the present litigation as a defendant in support of the Secretary. as Amici Curiae 50. §§ 1603(a), 1604(d) and (e).
. Brief for State of California et al. This rephrasing is not a distinction without a difference; rather, it reflects the Court's unprecedented view that Congress is free under the Commerce Clause to assume a State's traditional sovereign power, and to do so without judicial review of its action. The application of the FLSA to SAMTA would be constitutional even had Congress not provided federal funding under UMTA. 392 U.S. at 205, 88 S.Ct., at 2028. 455 U.S., at 686, 102 S.Ct., at 1354. In 1954, one could still speak of a "burden of persuasion on those favoring national intervention" in asserting that "National action has .
Justice Black, in Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 427, 58 S.Ct. Under that summary, four conditions must be satisfied before a state activity may be deemed immune from a particular federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. 6663 et al. 1349, 71 L.Ed.2d 547 (1982), and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775, 102 S.Ct.
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. denied sub nom. 426 U.S., at 856, 96 S.Ct., at 2476 (emphasis added). 60 (1803), it has been the settled province of the federal judiciary "to say what the law is" with respect to the constitutionality of Acts of Congress. Sign up for the latest updates to support your virus response efforts! §§ 6(a)(1) and (6), 88 Stat. SATS managed to meet its operating expenses and bond obligations for the first decade of its existence without federal or local financial aid. Ante, at 556.
Joe G. Garcia, an employee of SAMTA, brought suit for overtime pay under Fair Labor Standards Act. Ibid. Ibid. 64, 78 L.Ed.2d 79 (1983). Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322, 54 S.Ct. See also Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 Mich.L.Rev. As a result of this division of powers, the state governments generally would be more important than the Federal Government. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce, or the exertion of the power of Congress over it, as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the effective execution of the granted power to regulate interstate commerce. 772 (1893), a defense quoted with approval in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79, 58 S.Ct. In an era when interstate commerce represented a tiny fraction of economic activity and most goods and services were produced and consumed close to home, the interstate commerce power left a broad range of activities beyond the reach of Congress. 543 (1954); La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 Wash.U.L.Q. As a result, there is now a real risk that Congress will gradually erase the diffusion of power between State and Nation on which the Framers based their faith in the efficiency and vitality of our Republic. 1792, 1801, 44 L.Ed.2d 363 (1975) (dissenting opinion), and, despite the difficulties that this Court and other courts have encountered so far, it normally might be fair to venture the assumption that case-by-case development would lead to a workable standard for determining whether a particular governmental function should be immune from federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. Congress' treatment of public mass transit reinforces our conviction that the national political process systematically protects States from the risk of having their functions in that area handicapped by Commerce Clause regulation.21. Many governmental functions of today have at some time in the past been non-governmental.
§ 201 et seq. . After initial argument, the cases were restored to our calendar for reargument, and the parties were requested to brief and argue the following additional question: "Whether or not the principles of the Tenth Amendment as set forth in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 [96 S.Ct. Ante, at 546. As recently as June 1, 1982, the five Justices who constitute the majority in this case also were the majority in FERC v. Mississippi. 1054, 75 L.Ed.2d 18 (1983), for example, the Court stated that "[t]he principle of immunity articulated in National League of Cities is a functional doctrine . Whatever effect the Court's decision may have in weakening the application of stare decisis, it is likely to be less important than what the Court has done to the Constitution itself. 2897, 73 L.Ed.2d 1309 (1982). Check back frequently as new jobs are posted every day. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S., at 172, 31 S.Ct., at 357. As Justice Frankfurter noted, the States are not merely a factor in the "shifting economic arrangements" of our country, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95, 69 S.Ct. If federalism so conceived and so carefully cultivated by the Framers of our Constitution is to remain meaningful, this Court cannot abdicate its constitutional responsibility to oversee the Federal Government's compliance with its duty to respect the legitimate interests of the States. Ante, at 549. See, e.g., the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974, 88 Stat.
. See also Brief for National League of Cities et al as Amici Curiae (a brief on behalf of every major organization representing the concerns of State and local governments). Moreover, the statute at issue in this case, the FLSA, is the identical statute that was at issue in National League of Cities. National League of Cities, 426 U.S., at 846-851, 96 S.Ct., at 2471-2474. This division of authority, according to Madison, would produce efficient government and protect the rights of the people: "In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people, is submitted to the administration of a single government; and usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. Of course, the Commerce Clause by its specific language does not provide any special limitation on Congress' actions with respect to the States.